Strategic voting and nomination
AbstractUsing computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting will be a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each voting rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as 'burying' and 'compromising', and how often each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (which can both reinforce two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I support my key results with analytical proofs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32200.
Date of creation: 14 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
strategic voting; tactical voting; strategic nomination; Condorcet; alternative vote; Borda count; approval voting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-07-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-07-21 (Positive Political Economics)
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