original papers : Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation
AbstractThe voting situations at which the Borda rule or the Copeland method can be manipulated by a single voter or a coalition of voters in three-alternative elections are characterized. From these characterizations, we derive (when possible) some analytical representations measuring the vulnerability of these rules to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. Our results suggest that the Borda rule is significantly more vulnerable to strategic manipulation than the Copeland method.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 7 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 6 April 2001 / Accepted: 14 December 2001
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- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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- Green-Armytage, James, 2011. "Strategic voting and nomination," MPRA Paper 32200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Slinko, Arkadii, 2004. "How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 289-293, May.
- Cervone, Davide P. & Dai, Ronghua & Gnoutcheff, Daniel & Lanterman, Grant & Mackenzie, Andrew & Morse, Ari & Srivastava, Nikhil & Zwicker, William S., 2012. "Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 11-27.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008.
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- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2006. "On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200610, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Working Papers halshs-00785366, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Working Papers 1302, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
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