One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Cervone, Davide P. & Dai, Ronghua & Gnoutcheff, Daniel & Lanterman, Grant & Mackenzie, Andrew & Morse, Ari & Srivastava, Nikhil & Zwicker, William S., 2012. "Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 11-27.
- M. Sanver, 2009. "Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 461-471, June.
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