A Borda Measure for Social Choice Functions
AbstractThe question addressed in this paper is the order of magnitude of the difference between the Borda rule and any given social choice function. In this paper, a simple measure of the difference between the Borda rule and any given social choice function is proposed. It is given by the ratio of the best Borda score achieved by the social choice function under scrutiny over the Borda score of a Borda winner. More precisely, it is the minimum of this ratio over all possible profiles of preferences that is used. This "Borda measure" or at least bounds for this measure is also computed for well known social choice functions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique in its series Papers with number 9602.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
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UTILITY FUNCTION; VOTE; POLITICS;
Other versions of this item:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"La democratie: oui, mais laquelle?,"
9610, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
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