Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
AbstractWe consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a preferable outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the casting of a ballot that ranks a candidate in first causes that candidate to lose the election. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last causes that candidate to win. We show that when there are at least four candidates and when voters may express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet's principle must generate both of these paradoxes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 41527.
Date of creation: 24 Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Condorcet; no show; paradox; abstention; voting; participation; positive involvement; negative involvement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-10-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2012-10-06 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2012-10-06 (Positive Political Economics)
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"Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521791021, October.
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- Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
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