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Manipulability measures of common social choice functions

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Author Info
David A. Smith (1750 Mission Street #43, San Francisco, CA 94103, USA)
Abstract

All social choice functions are manipulable when more than two alternatives are available. I evaluate the manipulability of the Borda count, plurality rule, minimax set, and uncovered set. Four measures of manipulability are defined and computed stochastically for small numbers of agents and alternatives.

Social choice rules derived from the minimax and uncovered sets are found to be relatively immune to manipulation whether a sole manipulating agent has complete knowledge or absolutely no knowledge of the preferences of the others. The Borda rule is especially manipulable if the manipulating agent has complete knowledge of the others.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 16 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 639-661
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:639-661

Note: Received: 5 January 1996/Accepted: 31 July 1998
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  1. Marc Vorsatz, 2008. "Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 151-162, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-40, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2009. "Gains from manipulating social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 349-371, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  6. M. Sanver, 2009. "Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 461-471, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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