Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 26 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Donald G. Saari, 2003. "Unsettling aspects of voting theory," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 529-555, October.
- Lepelley, Dominique & Valognes, Fabrice, 2003. " Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 165-84, July.
- Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & M. Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2011. "An individual manipulability of positional voting rules," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 431-446, December.
- Sebastien Courtin & Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou, 2009. "Susceptibility to coalitional strategic sponsoring The case of parliamentary agendas," Post-Print hal-00914855, HAL.
- Geoffrey Pritchard & Mark Wilson, 2007. "Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 487-513, October.
- Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Working Papers 1302, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008.
"On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2006. "On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200610, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & Remzi Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2009. "Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 1-2, pages 37-61.
- Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.
- Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel & Mbih, Boniface & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2008. "Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1232-1242, December.
- Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou & Xingyu Zhao, 2010. "On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 107-127, June.
- Aleskerov, Fuad & Karabekyan, Daniel & Sanver, M. Remzi & Yakuba, Vyacheslav, 2012. "On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-73.
- Green-Armytage, James, 2011. "Strategic voting and nomination," MPRA Paper 32200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2009. "One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 553-574, November.
- Yuliya Veselova, 2012. "The difference between manipulability indexes in IC and IANC models," HSE Working papers WP BRP 17/EC/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Mostapha Diss, 2013. "Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules," Working Papers halshs-00785366, HAL.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.