Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity
AbstractTo what extent are some voting rules more vulnerable to strategic manipulation than others? In order to answer this question, representations are developed for the coalitional manipulability of eight voting rules under various assumptions concerning the likelihood that given voters' preference profiles are observed on three alternatives. Of particular interest is the impact that social homogeneity (defined as the tendency of voters' preference to be similar) has on the manipulability of voting rules. The results we obtain show that the hierarchy of the voting rules that results from our computations can crucially depend on the degree of social homogeneity. However, it turns out that, whatever the degree of homogeneity, the Hare method (or two-stage plurality) minimizes susceptibility to strategic manipulation by coalitions of voters in three-candidate elections. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 116 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
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