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The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men

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Author Info
Aki Lehtinen ()
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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-007-9178-5
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 133 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 73-90
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:133:y:2007:i:1:p:73-90

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Related research
Keywords: Strategic voting; Borda rule; Welfare; Simulation; D71; D81;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 2002. "Positional rules of collective decision-making," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 361-394 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Amrita Dhillon & Jean-Francois Mertens, 1999. "Relative Utilitarianism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 471-498, May.
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  3. Thierry Marchant, 2000. "Does the Borda rule provide more than a ranking?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 381-391. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. David A. Smith, 1999. "Manipulability measures of common social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 639-661. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Donald G. Saari, 2003. "Unsettling aspects of voting theory," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 529-555, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. David P. Myatt & Stephen D. Fisher, 2002. "Everything is Uncertain and Uncertainty is Everything: Strategic Voting in Simple Plurality Elections," Economics Series Working Papers 115, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jac C. Heckelman, 2003. "Probabilistic Borda rule voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 455-468, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lehtinen, Aki, 2006. "Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 50(9), pages 2495-2507, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Michael Dummett, 1998. "The Borda count and agenda manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 289-296. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Donald Saari, 2006. "Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 107-129, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Saari, Donald G, 1990. " Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
  12. Ilia Tsetlin & Michel Regenwetter & Bernard Grofman, 2003. "The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 387-398, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Garcia-Lapresta, Jose Luis & Martinez-Panero, Miguel, 2002. " Borda Count versus Approval Voting: A Fuzzy Approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 167-84, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "In Silico Voting Experiments," Working Papers hal-00390376_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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