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Voting Games and Acyclic Collective Choice Rules Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Truchon, M.
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Paper provided by Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique in its series Papers with number
9315.
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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1993Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:lavape:9315Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITE LAVAL, GREPE DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIQUE, QUEBEC G1K 7P4. Phone: (418) 656-5122 Fax: (418) 656-2707 Email: Web page: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: voting ; game theory ;
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.
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