Product filters, acyclicity and Suzumura consistency
AbstractIn a seminal contribution, Hansson (1976) demonstrates that the collection of decisive coalitions associated with an Arrovian social welfare function forms an ultrafilter. He goes on to show that if transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity as the coherence property imposed on a social relation, the set of decisive coalitions is a filter. We examine the notion of decisiveness with acyclical or Suzumura consistent social preferences and without the assumption that the social relation is reflexive and complete. This leads to a new set-theoretic concept applied to product spaces.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 64 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2010. "Product Filters, Acyclicity and Suzumura Consistency," Cahiers de recherche 20-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2010. "Product Filters, Acyclicity and Suzumura Consistency," Cahiers de recherche 2010-11, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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