Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 16 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
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- Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel & Mbih, Boniface, 2000. "A note on the core of voting games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 367-372, April.
- Bertrand Tchantcho & Lawrence Diffo Lambo, 2008. "A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 533-542, December.
- Truchon, Michel, 1995.
"Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules,"
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Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 165-179, April.
- Storcken,Ton, 1995. "Strategy-proof preference rules," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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