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Social Decision Functions and the Veto

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  • Blau, Julian H
  • Deb, Rajat

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  • Blau, Julian H & Deb, Rajat, 1977. "Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 871-879, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:45:y:1977:i:4:p:871-79
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Truchon M., 1996. "Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 55-55, February.
    2. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections," Papers 2008.08451, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    3. Allan Feldman, 1979. "Nonmanipulable multi-valued social decision functions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 177-188, June.
    4. Allan M Feldman & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World," Working Papers 2007-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Susumu Cato, 2010. "Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 267-284, July.
    6. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Axioms for defeat in democratic elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 475-524, October.
    7. Allan M. Feldman & Roberto Serrano, 2006. "Darwinian Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Two Simple Single-Profile Versions," Working Papers 2006-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    8. Florian Brandl & Felix Brandt, 2020. "Arrovian Aggregation of Convex Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 799-844, March.
    9. Brandt, Felix & Harrenstein, Paul, 2011. "Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1721-1731, July.
    10. Sanchez, M.Carmen & Peris, Josep E., 2006. "Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(7-8), pages 843-853, November.
    11. Lahiri, Somdeb, 2009. "A sufficient condition for acyclic social choice in a single-profile world," MPRA Paper 14129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Wesley H. Holliday & Mikayla Kelley, 2021. "Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model," Papers 2108.01134, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
    13. Sholomov, Lev A., 2000. "Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 81-107, January.
    14. Julian H. Blau & Donald J. Brown, 1978. "The Structure of Neutral Monotonic Social Functions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 485, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    15. Allan M Feldman & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World," Working Papers 2008-8, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    16. Quesada, Antonio, 2003. "(100-200/m)% veto power," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 83-92, June.
    17. Satish Jain, 1996. "Structure of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules with quasi-transitive individual preferences," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 195-212, June.

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