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A sufficient condition for acyclic social choice in a single-profile world

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Author Info
Lahiri, Somdeb

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Abstract

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14129/
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14174/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14129.

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Date of creation: 17 Mar 2009
Date of revision: 20 Mar 2009
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14129

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Related research
Keywords: acyclic; index; single-profile; social welfare relation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 328. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ferejohn, John A. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1979. "Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 28-45, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Blau, Julian H & Deb, Rajat, 1977. "Social Decision Functions and the Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 871-79, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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