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Approval Voting

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  • Robert J. Weber

Abstract

Under approval voting, a voter may cast single votes for each of any number of candidates. In this paper, the history of approval voting and some of its properties are reviewed. When voters vote sincerely, approval voting compares favorably with both the plurality rule and Borda's rule in yielding outcomes reflective of the electorate's will. When voters vote strategically, perverse outcomes possible under other rules cannot arise at equilibrium under approval voting. Well-known 'median voter' results in two-candidate positioning games generalize to multicandidate settings under approval voting but not under the plurality rule.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.39
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 9 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (Winter)
Pages: 39-49

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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:39-49

Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.39
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Cited by:
  1. Truchon, M., 1996. "La democratie: oui, mais laquelle?," Papers 9610, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
  2. Matias Nunez, 2013. "The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-00917101, HAL.
  3. Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "On the origins of electoral systems and political parties. The role of elections in multi-member districts," Economics Working Papers 814, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  4. Enriqueta Aragonès & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss, 2005. "Making Statements and Approval Voting," Working Papers 237, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Alcantud, José Carlos R. & de Andres Calle, Rocio & Cascon, José Manuel, 2012. "Approval consensus measures," MPRA Paper 39610, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Micael Castanheira De Moura & Laurent Bouton, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
  8. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
  9. Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election," MPRA Paper 50674, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Apr 2011.
  10. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007," Post-Print halshs-00337290, HAL.
  11. Eivind Stensholt, 2010. "Voces populi and the art of listening," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 291-317, July.
  12. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Smaoui, Hatem, 2012. "The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing," TSE Working Papers 12-313, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  13. Yilmaz, Mustafa R., 1999. "Can we improve upon approval voting?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 89-100, March.

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