Elections and Strategic Positioning Games
AbstractWe formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and stragetic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e., the principals) compete for voters (i.e., agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is defined as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payoffs to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we define the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe (1994)) and apply Chwe s result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number mwooders-00-04.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 11 Oct 1999
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Other versions of this item:
- Page, Jr Frank H & Wooders, Myrna H, 1999. "Elections And Strategic Positioning Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 545, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-07-23 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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