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Two results about generic non cooperative voting games with plurality rule

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Author Info
DE SINOPOLI, Francesco

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Abstract

In this paper, we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium distributions over outcomes is finite. Furthermore, we offer an example (due to Govindan and McLennan) that shows the impossibility of extending such results to a general framework.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1998034.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998034

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  1. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-71, March.
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  1. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1998. "Strategic stability and non cooperative voting games: the plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers 1998043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  2. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999. "Further remarks on strategic stability in plurality games," CORE Discussion Papers 1999030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  3. IANNANTUONI, Giovanna, 1999. "Divided government and dominance solvability," CORE Discussion Papers 1999065, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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