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Patience and Time Consistency in Collective Decisions

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  • Laurent Denant-Boèmont

    (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France)

  • Enrico Diecidue

    (INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France)

  • Olivier L'Haridon

    (CREM UMR CNRS 6211 and GREGHEC, University of Rennes 1, France)

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    Abstract

    We present new evidence from the lab on the outcomes resulting from collective and individual decisions over time. We combined static and longitudinal methods to test four conditions on individual and collective time preferences: impatience, stationarity, age independence, and dynamic consistency. The collective decision process was designed to favor coordination through initial communication over voting intentions. Our main results are the following. First, individuals were impatient and deviated from consistent behavior. On the other hand, groups made patient and highly consistent decisions. Our voting mechanism helped the groups to converge and make stable and dynamically consistent decisions.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 201329.

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    Date of creation: Sep 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201329

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    Postal: CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) – Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 RENNES Cedex
    Phone: 02 23 23 35 47
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    Web page: http://crem.univ-rennes1.fr/
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    Postal: CREM (UMR CNRS 6211) - Faculty of Economics, 7 place Hoche, 35065 Rennes Cedex - France
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