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Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy

Author

Listed:
  • Steven P. Lalley
  • E. Glen Weyl

Abstract

Can mechanism design save democracy? We propose a simple design that offers a chance: individuals pay for as many votes as they wish using a number of "voice credits" in the votes they buy. Only quadratic cost induces marginal costs linear in votes purchased and thus welfare optimality if individuals' valuation of votes is proportional to their value of changing the outcome. A variety of analysis and evidence suggests that this still-nascent mechanism has significant promise to robustly correct the failure of existing democracies to incorporate intensity of preference and knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven P. Lalley & E. Glen Weyl, 2018. "Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 108, pages 33-37, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:108:y:2018:p:33-37
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20181002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Davide Grossi, 2021. "Lecture Notes on Voting Theory," Papers 2105.00216, arXiv.org.
    2. Takeshi Kato & Yasuhiro Asa & Misa Owa, 2021. "Positionality-Weighted Aggregation Methods for Cumulative Voting," International Journal of Social Science Studies, Redfame publishing, vol. 9(2), pages 79-88, December.
    3. Jon X. Eguia & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 2811-2828, September.
    4. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2021. "Vote Trading in Power-Sharing Systems: A Laboratory Investigation," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(636), pages 1849-1882.
    5. Andrzej Baranski & Nicholas Haas & Rebecca Morton, 2020. "Majoritarian Bargaining over Budgetary Divisions and Policy," Working Papers 20200052, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Jul 2020.
    6. John C. Goodman & Philip K. Porter, 2021. "Will quadratic voting produce optimal public policy?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 141-148, January.
    7. David K. Levine, 2020. "Radical Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(2), pages 471-487, June.
    8. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Sang-Hyun Kim, 2021. "The Central Influencer Theorem: Spatial Voting Contests with Endogenous Coalition Formation," Working papers 2021rwp-193, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    9. Joo, Mingyu & Kim, Seung Hyun & Ghose, Anindya & Wilbur, Kenneth C., 2023. "Designing Distributed Ledger technologies, like Blockchain, for advertising markets," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 12-21.
    10. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 15311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Darcy W. E. Allen & Chris Berg & Aaron M. Lane & Jason Potts, 2020. "Cryptodemocracy and its institutional possibilities," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 363-374, September.
    12. Jon X. Eguia & Nicole Immorlica & Steven P. Lalley & Katrina Ligett & Glen Weyl & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2023. "Efficiency in Collective Decision-Making via Quadratic Transfers," Papers 2301.06206, arXiv.org.
    13. Xefteris, Dimitrios & Ziros, Nicholas, 2018. "Strategic vote trading under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 52-58.
    14. Takeshi Kato & Yasuhiro Asa & Misa Owa, 2020. "Positionality-Weighted Aggregation Methods for Cumulative Voting," Papers 2008.08759, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
    15. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "Lemons and Peaches: A (Robust) Multi-stage Buying Mechanism with Multiple Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 14063, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2022. "Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 153-176.
    17. Eguia, Jon & Immorlica, Nicole & Ligett, Katrina & Weyl, Glen & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Quadratic voting with multiple alternatives," Working Papers 2019-1, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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