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Winning by Losing

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  • Dmitry Dagaev
  • Konstantin Sonin

Abstract

In sport tournaments, the rules are presumably structured in a way that any participant cannot benefit by losing instead of winning. We show that tournament systems, consisting of multiple round-robin and knockout tournaments with noncumulative prizes, which are ubiquitous around the world, are generically incentive incompatible. We use our model to discuss potential remedies and applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry Dagaev & Konstantin Sonin, 2018. "Winning by Losing," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 19(8), pages 1122-1146, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:19:y:2018:i:8:p:1122-1146
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002517704022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

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    2. Krumer, Alex & Megidish, Reut & Sela, Aner, 2023. "Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 50-57.
    3. Csató, László, 2019. "A note on the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying play-offs," MPRA Paper 93006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    6. László Csató, 2020. "Optimal Tournament Design: Lessons From the Men’s Handball Champions League," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(8), pages 848-868, December.
    7. Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2020. "Fair elimination-type competitions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(2), pages 528-535.
    8. Csató, László & Petróczy, Dóra Gréta, 2022. "Hogyan számszerűsíthető az ösztönzéskompatibilitás? Esettanulmány a sport világából [Quantifying incentive compatibility: a case study from the world of sports]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 841-852.
    9. Guajardo, Mario & Krumer, Alex, 2023. "Format and schedule proposals for a FIFA World Cup with 12 four-team groups," Discussion Papers 2023/2, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    10. László Csató, 2021. "A comparison of penalty shootout designs in soccer," 4OR, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 183-198, June.
    11. Csató, László & Petróczy, Dóra Gréta, 2018. "Néhány gondolat a labdarúgás rangsorolási szabályairól a 2018. évi labdarúgó-világbajnokság európai selejtezője kapcsán [Some ideas on ranking rules in association football in the light of the Euro," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(6), pages 632-649.
    12. László Csató, 2019. "UEFA Champions League Entry Has Not Satisfied Strategyproofness in Three Seasons," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(7), pages 975-981, October.
    13. Csató, László, 2023. "How to avoid uncompetitive games? The importance of tie-breaking rules," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(3), pages 1260-1269.
    14. László Csató, 2022. "How to design a multi-stage tournament when some results are carried over?," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 44(3), pages 683-707, September.
    15. Csató, László, 2022. "Quantifying incentive (in)compatibility: A case study from sports," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(2), pages 717-726.
    16. Szádoczki, Zsombor, 2022. "Operációkutatás a sportok profitabilitásáért. László Csató: Tournament Design. How Operations Research Can Improve Sports Rules? Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, 175 o," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 283-288.
    17. Marta Boczoń & Alistair J. Wilson, 2023. "Goals, Constraints, and Transparently Fair Assignments: A Field Study of Randomization Design in the UEFA Champions League," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3474-3491, June.

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