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The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

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Barbera, Salvador

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 45 (1977)
Issue (Month): 7 (October)
Pages: 1573-88
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:45:y:1977:i:7:p:1573-88

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1972. "General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(2), pages 185-92, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Duggan, John & Schwartz, Thomas, 1992. "Strategic Manipulability is Inescapable: Gibbard-Satterthwaite without Resoluteness," Working Papers 817, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  3. Walter Bossert, . "Opportunity Sets and the Measurement of Information," Discussion Papers 98/6, University of Nottingham, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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