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Strategy-proof judgment aggregation


Author Info

  • Franz Dietrich

    (Center for Junior Research Fellows, University of Konstanz)

  • Christian List

    (Dept. of Government, London School of Economics)


In the theory of judgment aggregation on connected propositions, an important question remains open: Which aggregation rules are manipulable and which are strategy-proof? We define manipulability and strategy- proofness in judgment aggregation, characterize all strategy-proof aggregation rules, and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Among other ways to avoid the impossibility, we discuss weakening strategy-proofness itself. Comparing two prominent aggregation rules in the literature, we show that "conclusion-based voting" is strategy-proof, but generates incomplete judgments, while "premise-based voting" is only strategy-proof for "reason-oriented" individuals. Surprisingly, for "outcome-oriented" individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0404007.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 18 Apr 2004
Date of revision: 25 Jul 2005
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0404007

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31. pdf, prepared with latex
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Keywords: judgment aggregation; logic; strategic voting; strategy-proofness; characterization theorem; impossibility theorem; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; doctrinal paradox; discursive dilemma; premise-based procedure; conclusion-based procedure;

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