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Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation

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Author Info
James Schummer

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Abstract

Though some economic environments provide allocation rules that are implementable in dominant strategies (strategy-proof), a significant number of environments yield impossibility results. On the other hand, while there are quite general possibility results regarding implementation in Nash or Bayesian equilibrium, these equilibrium concepts make strong assumptions about the knowledge that players possess, or about the way they deal with uncertainty. As a compromise between these two notions, we propose a solution concept built on one premise: Players who do not have much to gain by manipulating an allocation rule will not bother to manipulate it. We search for efficient allocation rules for 2-agent exchange economies that never provide players with large gains from cheating. Though we show that such rules are very inequitable, we also show that some such rules are significantly more flexible than those that satisfy the stronger condition of strategy-proofness.

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1278.

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Date of creation: Nov 1999
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1278

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Keywords: Strategy-proof almost dominant strategy

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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  4. Schummer, J. & Thomson, W., 1996. "Two Derivations of the Uniform Rule and an Application to Bankruptcy," RCER Working Papers 423, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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  5. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 417-35, May.
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  16. John Duggan, 1997. "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1175-1200, September.
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  18. Revia, C. & Corchon, L.C., 1993. "On the Generic Impossibility of Truthful Behavior: A Simple Approach," Papers 93-06, Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas.
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  20. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Ehlers,L. & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2000. "Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems," Research Memoranda 038, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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