A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 69 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
Tournaments; Monotonicity; Condorcet consistency; Nash implementation;
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