We show that in the context of repeated implementation, any social choice rule which realizes all alternatives for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time is Nash implementable. The results complement those of the virtual implementation literature.
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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number
1179.
Length: 7 pages Date of creation: Sep 2003 Date of revision: Publication status: Published: published in Economic Letters 83 (2004) pp. 263-268. Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1179
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ehud Kalai & John O. Ledyard, 1997.
"Repeated Implementation,"
Discussion Papers
1205, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John, 1997.
"Repeated Implementation,"
Working Papers
1027, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]