Hydrogen Transport and the Spatial Requirements of Renewable Energy
AbstractUnlike oil and coal, which are compressed forms of energy, renewable energy requires unusually large land areas. This article calculates the consequences of a switch to hydrogen-cell vehicles powered by electricity from wind turbines. It then re-does the calculation for three other green energy sources : wave power ; biofuels ; solar energy. We argue that policy-makers and social scientists need to understand the significant spatial demands of a move to a carbon-free society.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 903.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Renewable energy ; wind power ; land use ; energy efficiency ; wind turbines ; transport ; environmental ; solar ; biomass ; wave;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
- R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
- R40 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2009-05-30 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2009-05-30 (Environmental Economics)
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