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Hydrogen Transport and the Spatial Requirements of Renewable Energy

Author

Listed:
  • Ashraf-Ball, Hezlin
  • Oswald, Andrew J.

    (Department of Economics, Warwick University)

  • Oswald, James I.

Abstract

Unlike oil and coal, which are compressed forms of energy, renewable energy requires unusually large land areas. This article calculates the consequences of a switch to hydrogen-cell vehicles powered by electricity from wind turbines. It then re-does the calculation for three other green energy sources : wave power ; biofuels ; solar energy. We argue that policy-makers and social scientists need to understand the significant spatial demands of a move to a carbon-free society.

Suggested Citation

  • Ashraf-Ball, Hezlin & Oswald, Andrew J. & Oswald, James I., 2009. "Hydrogen Transport and the Spatial Requirements of Renewable Energy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 903, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:903
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Renewable energy ; wind power ; land use ; energy efficiency ; wind turbines ; transport ; environmental ; solar ; biomass ; wave;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
    • R40 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - General

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