A minimax procedure for electing committees
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 132 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Minimax procedure; Minisum procedure; Approval balloting; Committee election; Hamming distance;
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:1:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
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