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A minimax procedure for electing committees

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Author Info

  • Steven Brams

    ()

  • D. Kilgour

    ()

  • M. Sanver

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-007-9165-x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 132 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 401-420

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:401-420

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords: Minimax procedure; Minisum procedure; Approval balloting; Committee election; Hamming distance;

References

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  1. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  2. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236 Elsevier.
  3. Thomas C. Ratliff, 2003. "Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 433-454, December.
  4. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  5. Salvador Barberà & Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev, 1998. "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9804001, EconWPA.
  6. Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
  7. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
  8. BARBERA, Salvador & BOSSERT, Walter & PATTANAIK, Prasanta K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2001-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  9. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S., 1996. "The Paradox of Multiple Elections," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 96-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  10. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 615-627.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Patrik Eklund & Harrie De Swart, 2007. "Consensus reaching in committees," Post-Print halshs-00159838, HAL.
  2. Eyal Baharad & Jacob Goldberger & Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan, 2010. "Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records," Working Papers 2010-20, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  3. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2013. "Unanimity and the Anscombe’s Paradox," Working Papers, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University 201301, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
  4. Tuğçe Çuhadaroğlu & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 525-536, April.
  5. Sanver, M. Remzi & Selçuk, Özer, 2010. "A characterization of the Copeland solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 354-355, June.
  6. Christian Klamler & Daniel Eckert, 2008. "Antipodality in committee selection," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(1), pages 1-5.
  7. Clark Bowman & Jonathan Hodge & Ada Yu, 2014. "The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 111-124, June.
  8. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ðura-Georg Granić, 2012. "Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 171-205, June.
  9. Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Satisfaction approval voting," MPRA Paper 22709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2010. "Simple Collective Identity Functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 417-443, April.
  11. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2009. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 317-333, February.
  12. Caminada, Martin & Pigozzi, Gabriella & Podlaszewski, Mikolaj, 2011. "Manipulation in Group Argument Evaluation," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6902, Paris Dauphine University.
  13. Klamler, Christian & Pferschy, Ulrich & Ruzika, Stefan, 2012. "Committee selection under weight constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 48-56.
  14. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:1:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Steven Brams & Michael Hansen & Michael Orrison, 2006. "Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 361-366, September.

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