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An axiomatic analysis of ranking sets under simple categorization

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  • José Alcantud

    ()

  • Ritxar Arlegi

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13209-011-0061-8
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Spanish Economic Association in its journal SERIEs.

Volume (Year): 3 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 227-245

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Handle: RePEc:spr:series:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:227-245

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Related research

Keywords: Ranking sets; Additive representation; Categorization; D01; D71; D81;

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References

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  1. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236 Elsevier.
  2. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
  3. Dimitrov, D.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Sung, S.C., 2006. "Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-194178, Tilburg University.
  4. David Schmeidler, 1998. "Between Liberalism and Democracy," Working Papers, Ohio State University, Department of Economics 98-18, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
  5. Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 2001. "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 40-78, October.
  6. Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu & Walter Bossert, 2000. "Choice under complete uncertainty: axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 295-312.
  7. Dimitrov, Dinko & Sung, Shao Chin & Xu, Yongsheng, 2007. "Procedural group identification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 137-146, September.
  8. Burani, Nadia & Zwicker, William S., 2003. "Coalition formation games with separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-52, February.
  9. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 115-128, 07.
  10. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
  11. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2003. "Collective Choice under Dichotomous Preferences," Working Papers, Rice University, Department of Economics 2003-09, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  12. Antonio Romero-Medina, 2001. "More on preference and freedom," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 179-191.
  13. Fishburn, Peter C., 1992. "Signed orders and power set extensions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-19, February.
  14. Dolors Berga & Gustavo Berganti?s & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme, 2002. "Voting by Committees with Exit," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 511.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  15. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  16. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2004. "Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 257-279, 01.
  17. Arlegi, Ricardo, 2007. "Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 131-143, July.
  18. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics, Boston College Department of Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics.
  19. Barbera, S. & Barrett, C. R. & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1984. "On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 301-308, August.
  20. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 469-499, December.
  21. Jones, Peter & Sugden, Robert, 1982. "Evaluating choice," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 47-65, June.
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