Voting by Committees with Exit
AbstractWe study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barber?Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 511.02.
Date of creation: 15 May 2002
Date of revision:
Strategy-proofness; voting; stability; and committees;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Berga, Dolors & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2003.
"On Exiting after Voting,"
Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona
6, Department of Economics, University of Girona.
- Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2003. "On exiting after voting," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 30(2 Year 20), pages 261-288, December.
- D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme, 2006. "On Exiting After Voting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 33-54, April.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Ruud Hendrickx & Peter Borm, 2004.
"Good and bad objects: the symmetric difference rule,"
AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-7.
- Borm, P.E.M. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2004. "Good and bad objects: The symmetric difference rule," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-141882, Tilburg University.
- José Alcantud & Ritxar Arlegi, 2012. "An axiomatic analysis of ranking sets under simple categorization," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 227-245, March.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:11:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Xavier Vila).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.