Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Good and bad objects: the symmetric difference rule

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dinko Dimitrov

    ()
    (Tilburg University)

  • Ruud Hendrickx

    ()
    (Tilburg University)

  • Peter Borm

    ()
    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize a cardinality-based rule which arises naturally in this dichotomous setting.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2004/Volume4/EB-04D60002A.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 4 (2004)
Issue (Month): 11 ()
Pages: 1-7

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04d60002

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Fishburn, Peter C., 1992. "Signed orders and power set extensions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-19, February.
  2. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Dov Samet & David Schmeidler, 1999. "Between Liberalism and Democracy," Game Theory and Information 9908001, EconWPA.
  4. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 469-499, December.
  5. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Burani, Nadia & Zwicker, William S., 2003. "Coalition formation games with separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 27-52, February.
  7. Barbera, S. & Bossert, W. & Pattanaik, P.K., 2001. "Ranking Sets of Objects," Cahiers de recherche 2001-02, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  8. Dolors Berga & Gustavo Berganti?s & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme, 2002. "Voting by Committees with Exit," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 511.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. repec:lmu:muenec:6431 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2010. "Simple Collective Identity Functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 417-443, April.
  3. Ritxar Arlegi & Dinko Dimitrov, 2005. "On freedom, lack of information and the preference for easy choices," Working Papers 364, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  4. Ricardo Arlegi & Dinko Dimitrov, 2006. "On Freedom of Choice, Ambiguity, and the Preference for Easy Choices," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 0607, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  5. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Working Papers 367, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04d60002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.