This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2001-02-14 (All new papers)

1. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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   • Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Deb, Rajat & Pattanaik, Prasanta K. & Razzolini, Laura, 1997. "Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 74-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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4. Rubinstein, Ariel & Fishburn, Peter C., 1986. "Algebraic aggregation theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 63-77, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. A. Rubinstein & A. Kasher, 1998. "On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s5, Economics Department, Princeton University.

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1. Kotaro Suzumura & Naoki Yoshihara, 2006. "On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights," Discussion Paper Series a478, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
2. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200509, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 335-354, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. David Heyd & Uzi Segal, 2006. "Democratically Elected Aristocracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 103-127, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David Heyd & Uzi Segal, 2002. "Democratically Elected Aristocracies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 529, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Stefano Vannucci, 2008. "The Libertarian Identification Rule in Finite Atomistic Lattices," Department of Economics University of Siena 526, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
5. Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2008. "Dichotomous Preferences and Power Set Extensions," Discussion Papers in Economics 6431, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Dinko Dimitrov & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2004. "Good and bad objects: the symmetric difference rule," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(11), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
7. Antoine Billot, 2007. "Social consistency and individual rationality," PSE Working Papers 2007-14, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
8. Dimitorv, D. & Sung, S.C., 2003. "On the axiomatic characterization of "who is a j?"," Discussion Paper 89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
9. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2008. "Judgment aggregation without full rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 15-39, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2006. "Judgment aggregation without full rationality," Research Memoranda 032, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
   • Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Judgment aggregation without full rationality," Research Memoranda 023, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
10. Dimitrov, D. & Borm, P. & Hendrickx, R., 2003. "Good and bad objects: cardinality-based rules," Discussion Paper 49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
11. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung & Yongsheng Xu, 2006. "Procedural group identification," Working Papers 383, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dimitrov, D. & Sung, S. & Xu, Y, 2003. "Procedural group identification," Discussion Paper 10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Dimitrov, Dinko & Sung, Shao Chin & Xu, Yongsheng, 2007. "Procedural group identification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 137-146, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "Individual Powers and Social Consent: An Axiomatic Approach," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200508, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Biung-Ghi Ju, 2007. "Individual Powers and Social Consent: An Axiomatic Approach," Discussion Paper Series 0717, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University. [Downloadable!]
13. Stefano Vannucci, 2007. "Virtuous Circles and Contested Identities: on Collective Identification Procedures with Independent Qualified Certification," Department of Economics University of Siena 501, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
14. Antoine Billot, 2007. "How to shake the Invisible Hand (when Robinson meets Friday)," PSE Working Papers 2007-13, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
15. Miller, Alan D., . "Separation of decision in group identification," Working Papers 1249, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]