This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Size Approval Voting

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu () (Departamento de Economía-UPNA)
Marc Vorsatz () (Maastricht University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the efective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other alternatives the very same individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved alternatives. Then, for a given pro¯le of individual votes, all those alternatives with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting is characterized by a set of natural properties.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://ftp.econ.unavarra.es/pub/DocumentosTrab/DT0703.PDF
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra in its series Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra with number 0703.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in
Handle: RePEc:nav:ecupna:0703

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Campus de Arrosadía - 31006 Pamplona (Spain)
Phone: 34 948 169340
Fax: 34 948 169 721
Web page: http://www.econ.unavarra.es

Order Information:
Postal: Papers are not sent in a centralized mode. You can download them with ftp, or contact the authors.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Javier Puértolas).

Related research
Keywords: Approval Voting; Characterization;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Sertel, Murat R., 1988. "Characterizing approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 207-211, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Baigent, Nick & Xu, Yongsheng, 1991. "Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 21-29, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 127-141, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Massó, Jordi & Vorsatz, Marc, 2006. "Weighted Approval Voting," Research Memoranda 038, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1987. "The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Working Papers 87-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Miguel Angel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2007. "Sincere Voting with Cardinal Preferences: Approval Voting," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 675.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes book chapters.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.