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Voting Procedures

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Brams, Steven J.
Fishburn, Peter

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Abstract

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9381/RR98-30.PDF
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 98-30.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 80 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:98-30

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Related research
Keywords: voting; social choice; manipulability; Condorcet criterion; proportional representation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Rudolf Berghammer & Harrie de Swart, 2006. "Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2006.77, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  2. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Patrik Eklund & Harrie De Swart, 2007. "Consensus reaching in committees," Post-Print halshs-00159838_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  3. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1998. "Strategic stability and non cooperative voting games: the plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers 1998043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  4. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Steven Brams & Michael Hansen & Michael Orrison, 2006. "Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 361-366, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Geoffrey Pritchard & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "On the Average Minimum Size of a Manipulating Coalition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 263-277, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. SLINKO, Arkadii & WHITE, Shaun, 2006. "On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation," Cahiers de recherche 2006-20, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  9. M. Braham & F. Steffen, 2007. "The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 231-253, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
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