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Steven J. Brams

Personal Details

First Name:Steven
Middle Name:J.
Last Name:Brams
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pbr76
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/stevenbrams
Dept. of Politics New York University 19 West 4th St., 2nd Fl. New York, NY 10012 U.S.A.
(212) 998-8510
Terminal Degree:1968 Department of Economics; Northwestern University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

New York University

http://politics.as.nyu.edu/page/home
New York, New York

Research output

as
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Working papers

  1. Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail & D. Marc Kilgour, 2023. "Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The $m-n$ Rule," Papers 2303.04807, arXiv.org.
  2. Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S., 2021. "Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 106718, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2021. "Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible," MPRA Paper 106775, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Brams, Steven & Kilgour, Marc, 2021. "A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game," MPRA Paper 106809, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2021. "Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatible and Incompatible Properties," MPRA Paper 109395, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail, 2021. "Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black," Papers 2108.02547, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.
  7. Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S., 2019. "Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict," MPRA Paper 91370, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Brams, Steven J. & Mor, Ben D., 2019. "How Lies Induced Cooperation in "Golden Balls:" A Game-Theoretic Analysis," MPRA Paper 97604, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S., 2018. "Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases," MPRA Paper 86295, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail & D. Marc Kilgour & Walter Stromquist, 2018. "Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive," Papers 1808.06922, arXiv.org.
  11. Steven, Brams & Markus, Brill, 2018. "The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes," MPRA Paper 89739, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Brams, Steven & Landweber, Peter, 2018. "3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm," MPRA Paper 84683, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2017. "Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 340, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  14. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Potthoff, Richard F., 2017. "Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach," MPRA Paper 77931, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Brams, Steven & Kilgour, Marc, 2017. "Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games," MPRA Paper 77655, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S., 2016. "Making the Rules of Sports Fairer," MPRA Paper 69714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Isaksen, Aaron & Ismail, Mehmet & Brams, Steven J. & Nealen, Andy, 2015. "Catch-Up: A Game in Which the Lead Alternates," MPRA Paper 108784, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Brams, Steven & Kilgour, Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2015. "Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items," MPRA Paper 63189, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Brams, Steven & Potthoff, Richard, 2015. "The Paradox of Grading Systems," MPRA Paper 63268, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Brams, Steven & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2014. "How to divide things fairly," MPRA Paper 58370, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2014. "An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items," MPRA Paper 56587, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2014. "Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too," MPRA Paper 56582, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Steven, Brams & Marc, Kilgour, 2013. "Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal," MPRA Paper 48113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2013. "Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm," MPRA Paper 47400, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2012. "Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes," MPRA Paper 41773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J., 2011. "Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts," MPRA Paper 34263, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "When does approval voting make the "right choices"?," MPRA Paper 34262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule," MPRA Paper 30388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  29. Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Michael A. & Klamler, Christian, 2011. "N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division," MPRA Paper 34264, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Brams, Steven J. & Camilo, Gustavo & Franz, Alexandra D., 2011. "Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009," MPRA Paper 30390, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  31. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J., 2010. "Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts," MPRA Paper 22703, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  32. Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Michael A. & Klamler, Christian, 2010. "Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm," MPRA Paper 22704, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  33. Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Satisfaction approval voting," MPRA Paper 22709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  34. Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2010. "A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share," MPRA Paper 24807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  35. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, Marc, 2009. "Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation," Sustainable Development Papers 52337, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  36. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2009. "The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items," MPRA Paper 12774, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  37. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2008. "How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games," MPRA Paper 12751, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J. & Stromquist, Walter, 2008. "Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake," MPRA Paper 12772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  39. Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2008. "Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership," MPRA Paper 12776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  40. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2007. "Stabilizing Power Sharing," MPRA Paper 5771, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  41. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2007. "The Instability of Power Sharing," MPRA Paper 5769, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  42. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D.Marc Kilgour, 2003. "Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters," Working Papers 2003.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  43. Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan, 2002. "Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System," Discussion Papers 0202, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
  44. BOSSERT, Walter & BRAMS, Steven J. & KILGOUR, D. Marc, 2000. "Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-15, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  45. Brams, S.J. & Kulikov, M.S., 1998. "Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach," Working Papers 98-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  46. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter, 1998. "Voting Procedures," Working Papers 98-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  47. Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 1998. "Fallback Bargaining," Working Papers 98-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  48. Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 1998. "Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity," Working Papers 98-20, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  49. Brams, S.J., 1998. "To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises," Working Papers 98-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  50. Brams, Steven J. & Potthoff, Richard F., 1997. "Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options," Working Papers 97-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  51. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  52. Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M., 1997. "Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case," Working Papers 97-29, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  53. Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Christopher B., 1997. "Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games : Cycling, Frustration, and Power," Working Papers 97-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  54. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Mark, 1997. "The Truel," Working Papers 97-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  55. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S., 1996. "The Paradox of Multiple Elections," Working Papers 96-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  56. Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M., 1996. "Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?," Working Papers 96-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  57. Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M., 1996. "The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition," Working Papers 96-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  58. Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D., 1996. "A Procedure for Divorce Settlements," Working Papers 96-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  59. Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1996. "Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Working Papers 96-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  60. Brams, Steven J. & Denoon, David, 1996. "Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy," Working Papers 96-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  61. Brams, S.J., 1995. "Game Theory and Emotions," Working Papers 95-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  62. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1995. "Fair Division and Politics," Working Papers 95-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  63. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S., 1995. "How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?," Working Papers 95-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  64. Brams, Steven J., 1995. "Modeling Free Choice in Games," Working Papers 95-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  65. Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D. & Zwicker, William S., 1995. "A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem," Working Papers 95-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  66. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1994. "When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions," Working Papers 94-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  67. Fishburns, Peter C. & Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games," Working Papers 94-28, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  68. Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D. & Zwicker, William S., 1994. "Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes," Working Papers 94-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  69. Brams, Steven J., 1994. "The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves," Working Papers 94-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  70. Brams, S.J. & Merrill, S., 1993. "Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?," Working Papers 93-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  71. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1993. "Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness," Working Papers 93-29, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  72. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1993. "Fair Division by Point Allocation," Working Papers 93-42, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  73. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1992. "Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies," Working Papers 92-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  74. Brams, S.J. & Doherty, A.E., 1992. "Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement," Working Papers 92-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  75. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1992. "Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse," Working Papers 92-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  76. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1992. "An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm," Working Papers 92-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  77. Brams, Steven J., 1992. "Cycles of Conflict," Working Papers 92-51, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  78. Brams, Steven J. & Mattli, Walter, 1992. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Working Papers 92-52, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  79. Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1992. "Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control," Working Papers 92-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  80. Fishburn, Peter C. & Brams, Steven J., 1991. "Yes-No Voting," Working Papers 91-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  81. Brams, Steven J., 1991. "Games Theory and Literature," Working Papers 91-29, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  82. Brams, Steven J. & Mor, Ben D., 1991. "When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?," Working Papers 91-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  83. Brams, Steven J. & Doherty, Ann E. & Weidner, Matthew L., 1991. "Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round," Working Papers 91-45, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  84. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Merrill, Samuel III, 1991. "Arbitration Procedures," Working Papers 91-38, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  85. Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D., 1991. "Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar," Working Papers 91-43, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  86. Brams, Steven J., 1991. "A Generic Negotiation Game," Working Papers 91-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  87. Brams, Steven J., 1990. "Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System To Elect A Governing Board," Working Papers 90-28, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  88. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1990. "Arms-Control Inspection Strtegies That Induce Compliance: A Game-Theoritic Analysis," Working Papers 90-40, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  89. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Davis, Morton D., 1990. "Unraveling In Exchange Games," Working Papers 90-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  90. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1990. "The Box Problem: To Switch Or Not To Switch?," Working Papers 90-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  91. Brams, Steven J., 1989. "Constrained Approval Voting: A Custom-Designed Election System," Working Papers 89-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  92. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1989. "Coalition Voting," Working Papers 89-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  93. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1989. "Approval Voting in Practice," Working Papers 89-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  94. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Weber, Shlomo, 1989. "Sequential Arbitration Procedures," Working Papers 89-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  95. Affuso, Paul J. & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1988. "Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 88-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  96. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1988. "Are Crisis Rational? A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 88-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  97. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1988. "Optimal Cheating And Inspection Strategies Under Inf," Working Papers 88-24, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  98. Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1988. "Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus," Working Papers 88-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  99. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1987. "National Security Games," Working Papers 87-42, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  100. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1987. "Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?," Working Papers 87-45, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  101. Brams, Steven J., 1987. "Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?," Working Papers 87-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  102. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1987. "The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Working Papers 87-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  103. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 86-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  104. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability," Working Papers 86-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  105. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 86-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  106. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars," Working Papers 86-35, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  107. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 86-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  108. Avenhaus, Rudolf & Brams, Steven J. & Fichtner, John & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "The Probability of Nuclear War," Working Papers 86-24, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  109. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1985. "Rational De-Escalation," Working Papers 85-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  110. Brams, Steven J. & Felsenthal, Dan S. & Maoz, Zeeve, 1985. "New Chairman Paradoxes," Working Papers 85-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  111. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1985. "The Path to Stable Deterrence," Working Papers 85-17, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  112. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1985. "Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 85-37, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  113. Brams, Steven J. & Felsenthal, Dan S. & Maoz, Zeeve, 1985. "Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting," Working Papers 85-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  114. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1985. "Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 85-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  115. Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1984. "Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best," Working Papers 84-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  116. Brams, Steven J., 1984. "Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 84-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  117. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1984. "Optimal Deterrence," Working Papers 84-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  118. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D., 1983. "The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 83-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  119. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1983. "Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures," Working Papers 83-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  120. Brams, Steven J., 1982. "Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections," Working Papers 82-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  121. Brams, Steven J. & Hessel, Marek P., 1982. "Threat Power in Sequential Games," Working Papers 82-14, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  122. Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1981. "Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 81-25, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  123. Brams, Steven J. & Hessel Marek, 1980. "Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games," Working Papers 80-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  124. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D., 1980. "Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries," Working Papers 80-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  125. Brams, Steven J., 1980. "Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience," Working Papers 80-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  126. Brams, Steven J. & Wittman, DOnald, 1980. "Nonmyoptic Equilibria," Working Papers 80-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  127. Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd & Kilgour, D. Marc, "undated". "A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices," Working Papers WP2011/2, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2022. "Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 1-23, June.
  2. Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts, 2022. "Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 1-6, July.
  3. Steven J. Brams & Mehmet S. Ismail, 2022. "Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 349-362, March.
  4. Steven J. Brams & Markus Brill & Anne-Marie George, 2022. "The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 283-300, February.
  5. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2020. "A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-7, August.
  6. Steven J. Brams, 2020. "Making Partisan Gerrymandering Fair: One Old and Two New Methods," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(1), pages 68-72, January.
  7. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Richard F. Potthoff, 2019. "Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 67-93, January.
  8. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2017. "Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 99-113, January.
  9. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2017. "Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 115-131, January.
  10. Steven Brams & Richard Potthoff, 2015. "The paradox of grading systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 193-210, December.
  11. Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan & D. Marc Kilgour, 2015. "A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 401-413, May.
  12. Steven Brams & Gustavo Camilo & Alexandra Franz, 2014. "Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 525-539, March.
  13. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 2013. "Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 1-18, June.
  14. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2012. "The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 615-631, July.
  15. Steven J Brams & D Marc Kilgour, 2012. "Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 507-525, October.
  16. Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2010. "A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 191-195, November.
  17. Steven Brams & Michael Jones & Christian Klamler, 2008. "Proportional pie-cutting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 353-367, March.
  18. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
  19. Richard Potthoff & Steven Brams, 2007. "Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 465-468, June.
  20. Steven Brams & Michael Hansen & Michael Orrison, 2006. "Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 361-366, September.
  21. Steven Brams, 2006. "The normative turn in public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 245-250, June.
  22. Steven Brams & Michael Jones & D. Kilgour, 2005. "Forming stable coalitions: The process matters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 67-94, July.
  23. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
  24. Steven J. Brams & Daniel L. King, 2005. "Efficient Fair Division," Rationality and Society, , vol. 17(4), pages 387-421, November.
  25. Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan, 2004. "Dividing the Indivisible," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(2), pages 143-173, April.
  26. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J., 2004. "Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 251-269, November.
  27. Steven J. Brams & Paul H. Edelman & Peter C. Fishburn, 2003. "Fair Division Of Indivisible Items," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 147-180, September.
  28. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D. Marc Kilgour, 2002. "Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 359-383, July.
  29. Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2002. "Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-202, August.
  30. Steven J. Brams, 2001. "Response to Randall Stone," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 245-254, April.
  31. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Competitive Fair Division," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 418-443, April.
  32. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Fallback Bargaining," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 287-316, July.
  33. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2001. "A nail-biting election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 409-414.
  34. Brams Steven J., 2000. "Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 1-11, April.
  35. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2000. "Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(2), pages 247-267.
  36. Steven J. Brams & Jeffrey M. Togman, 1999. "Agreement Through Threats: The Northern Ireland Case," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(03n04), pages 251-265.
  37. Steven J. Brams & Christopher B. Jones, 1999. "Catch-22 And King-Of-The-Mountain Games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 11(2), pages 139-167, May.
  38. Richard F. Potthoff & Steven J. Brams, 1998. "Proportional Representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 147-178, April.
  39. Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour, 1998. "The paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 211-236.
  40. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
  41. Steven J. Brams, 1997. "Game Theory And Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 91-124, February.
  42. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 1996. "Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(4), pages 397-417.
  43. Steven J. Brams & Jeffrey M. Togman, 1996. "Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 15(1), pages 99-112, February.
  44. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 1995. "When is Size a Liability?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 301-316, July.
  45. Brams, Steven J., 1995. "Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence. Edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt. Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1994. 213p. $74.95," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(2), pages 527-528, June.
  46. Brams Steven J., 1994. "Game Theory and Literature," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 32-54, January.
  47. Steven J. Brams & Walter Mattli, 1993. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 12(2), pages 1-39, February.
  48. Steven J. Brams & Ann E. Doherty, 1993. "Intransigence in Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 692-708, December.
  49. Steven J. Brams & Ben D. Mor, 1993. "When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(4), pages 432-454, October.
  50. D. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams, 1992. "Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(3), pages 395-414, September.
  51. Steven J. Brams, 1992. "A Generic Negotiation Game," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 53-66, January.
  52. Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1991. "Final-offer arbitration with a bonus," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 79-92, April.
  53. Steven J. Brams, 1991. "Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Playâ€," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(2), pages 252-257, April.
  54. Brams, Steven J & Nagel, Jack H, 1991. "Approval Voting in Practice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 1-17, August.
  55. Steven J. Brams, 1990. "Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 20(5), pages 67-80, October.
  56. Rudolf Avenhaus & John Fichtner & Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 1989. "The Probability of Nuclear War," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 26(1), pages 91-99, February.
  57. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn & Samuel Merrill, 1988. "The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 121-131, November.
  58. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1987. "Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 833-850, September.
  59. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 1987. "Optimal Threats," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(4), pages 524-536, August.
  60. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 1987. "Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(4), pages 547-572, December.
  61. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1986. "Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(10), pages 1346-1355, October.
  62. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1985. "Comment on The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting (Vol. 78, December 1984, pp. 952-958)," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 816-818, September.
  63. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1985. "Rejoinder to Niemi," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 819-819, September.
  64. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1985. "Response to Rabow," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(3), pages 375-376, March.
  65. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1984. "Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 397-410, January.
  66. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. & Straffin, Philip D., 1984. "Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346)," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 495-496, June.
  67. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1983. "Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(8), pages 927-941, August.
  68. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D., 1982. "Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 373-388, December.
  69. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1981. "Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 425-434, January.
  70. Steven J. Brams & Donald Wittman, 1981. "Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 6(1), pages 39-62, September.
  71. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1981. "Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 89-114, January.
  72. Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis, 1980. "Letter to the Editor—Authors' Rejoinder," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(4), pages 1024-1025, August.
  73. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. & Balinski, M. L. & Young, H. P., 1979. "Replies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 552-553, June.
  74. Brams, Steven J., 1978. "Another Solution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 1365-1366, December.
  75. Brams, Steven J., 1978. "Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 1362-1364, December.
  76. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Approval Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 831-847, September.
  77. Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis, 1978. "Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(6), pages 966-991, December.
  78. Steven Brams & Douglas Muzzio, 1977. "Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 67-83, December.
  79. Steven J. Brams, 1977. "The Network Television Game: There May be No Best Schedule," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 102-109, August.
  80. Steven J. Brams, 1977. "Deception in 2 × 2 Games," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 2(2), pages 171-203, February.
  81. Steven J. Brams, 1975. "Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(4), pages 596-612, December.
  82. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D., 1975. "Comment on “Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College”," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 155-156, March.
  83. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D., 1974. "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 113-134, March.
  84. Steven Brams & John Heilman, 1974. "When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 11-25, March.
  85. Riker, William H. & Brams, Steven J., 1973. "The Paradox of Vote Trading," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 1235-1247, December.
  86. Brams, Steven J. & O'Leary, Michael K., 1971. "Comment on Mayer's “A Note on ‘An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies’”," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 766-766, September.
  87. Brams, Steven J. & O'Leary, Michael K., 1970. "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 449-470, June.
  88. Steven J., Brams, 1968. "Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. By Deutsch Karl W.. (New York: John Wileu & Sons, 1967. Pp. 167. $5.95.)," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 1391-1392, December.
  89. Brams, Steven J., 1968. "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 461-475, June.
  90. Brams, Steven J., 1966. "Transaction Flows in the International System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 880-898, December.

Chapters

  1. Steven Brams & William Gehrlein & Fred Roberts & Maurice Salles, 2021. "Peter Fishburn," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Marc Fleurbaey & Maurice Salles (ed.), Conversations on Social Choice and Welfare Theory - Vol. 1, pages 165-169, Springer.
  2. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2014. "Satisfaction Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Rudolf Fara & Dennis Leech & Maurice Salles (ed.), Voting Power and Procedures, edition 127, pages 323-346, Springer.
  3. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37, Springer.
  4. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2009. "How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, pages 229-241, Springer.
  5. Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver, 2009. "Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts (ed.), The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order, pages 215-237, Springer.
  6. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2008. "The Instability of Power Sharing," Springer Books, in: Matthew Braham & Frank Steffen (ed.), Power, Freedom, and Voting, chapter 12, pages 227-243, Springer.
  7. Steven J. Brams, 2007. "Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures," Introductory Chapters, in: Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures, Princeton University Press.
  8. D. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver, 2006. "How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Bruno Simeone & Friedrich Pukelsheim (ed.), Mathematics and Democracy, pages 83-95, Springer.
  9. Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089, Elsevier.

    RePEc:spr:thdchp:978-3-642-02865-6_12 is not listed on IDEAS

Books

  1. Steven J. Brams, 2011. "Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015226, April.
  2. Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts (ed.), 2009. "The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-540-79128-7, July.
  3. Steven J. Brams, 2002. "Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262523329, April.
  4. Brams,Steven J. & Taylor,Alan D., 1996. "Fair Division," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521556446, October.

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 43 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (29) 2007-11-24 2007-11-24 2009-01-24 2009-01-24 2009-01-24 2009-01-24 2009-07-28 2010-05-22 2010-09-18 2011-02-26 2011-10-22 2011-10-22 2012-10-13 2013-06-24 2013-07-15 2014-06-14 2014-06-14 2014-11-12 2015-03-27 2016-03-10 2017-04-09 2017-04-09 2018-03-19 2018-03-26 2018-05-14 2019-01-28 2020-01-20 2021-03-29 2021-04-05. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (13) 2002-12-31 2007-11-24 2009-01-24 2009-07-28 2010-05-22 2010-05-22 2011-05-07 2011-05-07 2011-10-22 2014-06-14 2015-04-02 2017-04-09 2018-11-12. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (11) 2004-09-12 2011-10-22 2011-10-22 2012-10-13 2013-06-24 2013-07-15 2014-11-12 2015-03-27 2018-11-12 2021-03-29 2021-04-05. Author is listed
  4. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (9) 2009-07-28 2010-05-22 2010-05-22 2011-05-07 2011-10-22 2014-06-14 2015-04-02 2017-04-09 2018-11-12. Author is listed
  5. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (7) 2009-01-24 2009-01-24 2011-10-22 2013-06-24 2014-11-12 2017-04-09 2018-05-14. Author is listed
  6. NEP-SPO: Sports and Economics (6) 2016-03-10 2018-03-26 2018-09-03 2021-08-16 2022-01-17 2023-04-24. Author is listed
  7. NEP-CIS: Confederation of Independent States (3) 2011-10-22 2011-10-22 2011-10-22
  8. NEP-DES: Economic Design (3) 2021-03-29 2021-09-06 2023-04-24
  9. NEP-NET: Network Economics (3) 2009-07-28 2010-05-22 2011-05-07
  10. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (2) 2021-08-16 2021-09-06
  11. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (2) 2020-01-20 2021-04-05
  12. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2009-01-24
  13. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2011-02-26
  14. NEP-DEM: Demographic Economics (1) 2013-07-15
  15. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic and Financial History (1) 2002-12-31
  16. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2009-01-24
  17. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2009-01-24
  18. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2021-09-06

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