Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Steven J. Brams

Contents:

This is information that was supplied by Steven Brams in registering through RePEc. If you are Steven J. Brams , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Steven
Middle Name: J.
Last Name: Brams
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pbr76

Email:
Homepage: http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/stevenbrams
Postal Address: Dept. of Politics New York University 19 West 4th St., 2nd Fl. New York, NY 10012 U.S.A.
Phone: (212) 998-8510

Affiliation

New York University
Homepage: http://politics.as.nyu.edu/page/home
Location: New York, New York

Works

as in new window

Working papers

  1. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2014. "An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items," MPRA Paper 56587, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2014. "Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too," MPRA Paper 56582, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2013. "Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm," MPRA Paper 47400, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Steven, Brams & Marc, Kilgour, 2013. "Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal," MPRA Paper 48113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2012. "Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes," MPRA Paper 41773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule," MPRA Paper 30388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Brams, Steven J. & Camilo, Gustavo & Franz, Alexandra D., 2011. "Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009," MPRA Paper 30390, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "When does approval voting make the "right choices"?," MPRA Paper 34262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J., 2011. "Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts," MPRA Paper 34263, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Brams, Steven J. & Kaplan, Todd R & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices," MPRA Paper 28999, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Michael A. & Klamler, Christian, 2011. "N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division," MPRA Paper 34264, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Michael A. & Klamler, Christian, 2010. "Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm," MPRA Paper 22704, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Brams, Steven J & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2010. "Satisfaction approval voting," MPRA Paper 22709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2010. "A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share," MPRA Paper 24807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J., 2010. "Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts," MPRA Paper 22703, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams, 2009. "Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2009.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  17. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Klamler, Christian, 2009. "The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items," MPRA Paper 12774, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2008. "Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership," MPRA Paper 12776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J. & Stromquist, Walter, 2008. "Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake," MPRA Paper 12772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2008. "How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games," MPRA Paper 12751, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2007. "The Instability of Power Sharing," MPRA Paper 5769, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2007. "Stabilizing Power Sharing," MPRA Paper 5771, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Brams, S.J. & Sanver, R.M., 2003. "Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes," Working Papers 03-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  24. Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 2003. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Working Papers 03-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  25. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D.Marc Kilgour, 2003. "Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters," Working Papers 2003.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  26. Brams,S.L. & Kaplan,T.R., 2002. "Dividing the indivisible : procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system," Working Papers 340, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  27. Brams, S.J. & Kaplan, T.R., 2002. "Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System," Working Papers 02-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  28. Barbanel, J. B. & Brams, S. J., 2001. "Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free Procedures for 3 Person, 4 Persons, and Beyond," Working Papers 01-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  29. Brams, S. J. & Kilgour, M. D., 2001. "Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper," Working Papers 01-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  30. Brams, S. J. & Jones, M. A. & Kilgour, M. D., 2001. "Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions," Working Papers 01-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  31. Bossert, W. & Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 2000. "Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-15, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  32. Bossert, W. & Brams, S. J. & Kilgour, D. M., 2000. "Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, But Does That Matter?," Working Papers 00-19, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  33. Brams, S. J. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000. "A Nail-Biting Election," Working Papers 00-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  34. Brams, S. J. & Eldelman, P. H. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000. "Fair Division of Indivisible Items," Working Papers 00-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  35. Brams, S. J. & Eldelman, P. H. & Fishburn, P. C., 2000. "Paradoxes of Fair Division," Working Papers 00-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  36. Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 1999. "Competitive Fair Division," Working Papers 99-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  37. Brams, S.J. & Jones, M.A. & Kilgour, D.M., 1999. "The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions," Working Papers 99-19, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  38. Brams, S.J. & Kulikov, M.S., 1998. "Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach," Working Papers 98-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  39. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter, 1998. "Voting Procedures," Working Papers 98-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  40. Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 1998. "Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity," Working Papers 98-20, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  41. Brams, S.J., 1998. "To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises," Working Papers 98-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  42. Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 1998. "Fallback Bargaining," Working Papers 98-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  43. Brams, Steven J. & Potthoff, Richard F., 1997. "Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options," Working Papers 97-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  44. Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Christopher B., 1997. "Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games : Cycling, Frustration, and Power," Working Papers 97-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  45. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Mark, 1997. "The Truel," Working Papers 97-05, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  46. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  47. Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M., 1997. "Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case," Working Papers 97-29, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  48. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S., 1996. "The Paradox of Multiple Elections," Working Papers 96-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  49. Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1996. "Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Working Papers 96-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  50. Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M., 1996. "Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?," Working Papers 96-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  51. Brams, Steven J. & Denoon, David, 1996. "Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy," Working Papers 96-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  52. Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D., 1996. "A Procedure for Divorce Settlements," Working Papers 96-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  53. Brams, Steven J. & Togman, Jeffrey M., 1996. "The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition," Working Papers 96-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  54. Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D. & Zwicker, William S., 1995. "A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem," Working Papers 95-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  55. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1995. "Fair Division and Politics," Working Papers 95-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  56. Brams, S.J., 1995. "Game Theory and Emotions," Working Papers 95-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  57. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S., 1995. "How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?," Working Papers 95-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  58. Brams, Steven J., 1995. "Modeling Free Choice in Games," Working Papers 95-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  59. Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D. & Zwicker, William S., 1994. "Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes," Working Papers 94-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  60. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1994. "When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions," Working Papers 94-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  61. Brams, Steven J., 1994. "The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves," Working Papers 94-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  62. Fishburns, Peter C. & Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games," Working Papers 94-28, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  63. Brams, S.J. & Merrill, S., 1993. "Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?," Working Papers 93-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  64. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1993. "Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness," Working Papers 93-29, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  65. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1993. "Fair Division by Point Allocation," Working Papers 93-42, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  66. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1992. "An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm," Working Papers 92-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  67. Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1992. "Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control," Working Papers 92-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  68. Brams, Steven J., 1992. "Cycles of Conflict," Working Papers 92-51, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  69. Brams, S.J. & Doherty, A.E., 1992. "Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement," Working Papers 92-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  70. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1992. "Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies," Working Papers 92-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  71. Brams, S.J. & Taylor, A.D., 1992. "Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse," Working Papers 92-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  72. Brams, Steven J. & Mattli, Walter, 1992. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Working Papers 92-52, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  73. Brams, Steven J. & Taylor, Alan D., 1991. "Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar," Working Papers 91-43, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  74. Brams, Steven J., 1991. "Games Theory and Literature," Working Papers 91-29, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  75. Brams, Steven J., 1991. "A Generic Negotiation Game," Working Papers 91-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  76. Fishburn, Peter C. & Brams, Steven J., 1991. "Yes-No Voting," Working Papers 91-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  77. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Merrill, Samuel III, 1991. "Arbitration Procedures," Working Papers 91-38, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  78. Brams, Steven J. & Doherty, Ann E. & Weidner, Matthew L., 1991. "Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round," Working Papers 91-45, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  79. Brams, Steven J. & Mor, Ben D., 1991. "When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?," Working Papers 91-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  80. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1990. "Arms-Control Inspection Strtegies That Induce Compliance: A Game-Theoritic Analysis," Working Papers 90-40, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  81. Brams, Steven J., 1990. "Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System To Elect A Governing Board," Working Papers 90-28, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  82. Weber, S. & Kilgour, M. & Brams, S.J., 1990. "Sequential Arbitration Procedures," Papers 90-5, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  83. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1990. "The Box Problem: To Switch Or Not To Switch?," Working Papers 90-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  84. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Davis, Morton D., 1990. "Unraveling In Exchange Games," Working Papers 90-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  85. Brams, Steven J. & Nagel, Jack H., 1990. "Approval Voting In Practice," Working Papers 90-29, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  86. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1989. "Coalition Voting," Working Papers 89-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  87. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1989. "Approval Voting in Practice," Working Papers 89-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  88. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Weber, Shlomo, 1989. "Sequential Arbitration Procedures," Working Papers 89-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  89. Brams, Steven J., 1989. "Constrained Approval Voting: A Custom-Designed Election System," Working Papers 89-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  90. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1988. "Are Crisis Rational? A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 88-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  91. Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1988. "Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus," Working Papers 88-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  92. Affuso, Paul J. & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1988. "Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 88-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  93. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1988. "Optimal Cheating And Inspection Strategies Under Inf," Working Papers 88-24, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  94. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1987. "The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Working Papers 87-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  95. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1987. "National Security Games," Working Papers 87-42, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  96. Brams, Steven J., 1987. "Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?," Working Papers 87-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  97. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1987. "Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?," Working Papers 87-45, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  98. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 86-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  99. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars," Working Papers 86-35, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  100. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 86-08, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  101. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability," Working Papers 86-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  102. Avenhaus, Rudolf & Brams, Steven J. & Fichtner, John & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "The Probability of Nuclear War," Working Papers 86-24, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  103. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1986. "Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 86-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  104. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1985. "Rational De-Escalation," Working Papers 85-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  105. Brams, Steven J. & Felsenthal, Dan S. & Maoz, Zeeve, 1985. "Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting," Working Papers 85-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  106. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1985. "The Path to Stable Deterrence," Working Papers 85-17, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  107. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1985. "Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 85-37, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  108. Brams, Steven J. & Felsenthal, Dan S. & Maoz, Zeeve, 1985. "New Chairman Paradoxes," Working Papers 85-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  109. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1985. "Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 85-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  110. Brams, Steven J., 1984. "Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 84-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  111. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1984. "Optimal Deterrence," Working Papers 84-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  112. Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1984. "Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best," Working Papers 84-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  113. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1983. "Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures," Working Papers 83-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  114. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D., 1983. "The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 83-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  115. Brams, Steven J., 1982. "Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections," Working Papers 82-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  116. Brams, Steven J. & Hessel, Marek P., 1982. "Threat Power in Sequential Games," Working Papers 82-14, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  117. Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1981. "Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 81-25, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  118. Brams, Steven J. & Wittman, DOnald, 1980. "Nonmyoptic Equilibria," Working Papers 80-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  119. Brams, Steven J., 1980. "Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience," Working Papers 80-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  120. Brams, Steven J. & Hessel Marek, 1980. "Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games," Working Papers 80-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  121. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D., 1980. "Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries," Working Papers 80-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.

Articles

  1. Steven Brams & Gustavo Camilo & Alexandra Franz, 2014. "Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 525-539, March.
  2. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 2013. "Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-18, June.
  3. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2012. "The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 615-631, July.
  4. Steven J Brams & D Marc Kilgour, 2012. "Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 507-525, October.
  5. Athanassoglou, Stergios & Brams, Steven J. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2010. "A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 191-195, November.
  6. Steven Brams & Michael Jones & Christian Klamler, 2008. "Proportional pie-cutting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 353-367, March.
  7. Richard Potthoff & Steven Brams, 2007. "Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 465-468, June.
  8. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
  9. Steven Brams & Michael Hansen & Michael Orrison, 2006. "Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 361-366, September.
  10. Steven Brams, 2006. "The normative turn in public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 245-250, June.
  11. Steven Brams & Michael Jones & D. Kilgour, 2005. "Forming stable coalitions: The process matters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 67-94, July.
  12. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
  13. Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J., 2004. "Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 251-269, November.
  14. Steven J. Brams & Paul H. Edelman & Peter C. Fishburn, 2003. "Fair Division Of Indivisible Items," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 147-180, 09.
  15. Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2002. "Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-202, August.
  16. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D. Marc Kilgour, 2002. "Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 359-383, July.
  17. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Competitive Fair Division," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 418-443, April.
  18. Steven J. Brams, 2001. "Response to Randall Stone," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 245-254, April.
  19. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2001. "A nail-biting election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 409-414.
  20. Brams Steven J., 2000. "Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 1-11, April.
  21. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2000. "Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 247-267.
  22. Steven J. Brams & William S. Zwicker & D. Marc Kilgour, 1998. "The paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 211-236.
  23. Richard F. Potthoff & Steven J. Brams, 1998. "Proportional Representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 147-178, April.
  24. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
  25. Steven J. Brams & Jeffrey M. Togman, 1996. "Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 15(1), pages 99-112, February.
  26. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 1996. "Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 397-417.
  27. Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 1995. "When is Size a Liability?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 301-316, July.
  28. Brams Steven J., 1994. "Game Theory and Literature," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 32-54, January.
  29. Steven J. Brams & Ann E. Doherty, 1993. "Intransigence in Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 692-708, December.
  30. Steven J. Brams & Walter Mattli, 1993. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 12(2), pages 1-39, February.
  31. D. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams, 1992. "Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(3), pages 395-414, September.
  32. Steven J. Brams, 1992. "A Generic Negotiation Game," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 53-66, January.
  33. Brams, Steven J & Nagel, Jack H, 1991. " Approval Voting in Practice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 1-17, August.
  34. Brams, Steven J. & Merrill, Samuel III, 1991. "Final-offer arbitration with a bonus," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 79-92, April.
  35. Rudolf Avenhaus & John Fichtner & Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 1989. "The Probability of Nuclear War," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 26(1), pages 91-99, February.
  36. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn & Samuel Merrill, 1988. "The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 121-131, November.
  37. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 1987. "Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(4), pages 547-572, December.
  38. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1986. "Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(10), pages 1346-1355, October.
  39. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1985. "Response to Rabow," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(3), pages 375-376, March.
  40. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1984. "Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 397-410, January.
  41. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1983. "Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(8), pages 927-941, August.
  42. Brams, Steven J. & Davis, Morton D., 1982. "Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 373-388, December.
  43. Steven J. Brams & Donald Wittman, 1981. "Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 6(1), pages 39-62, September.
  44. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1981. "Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 89-114, January.
  45. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1981. "Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 425-434, January.
  46. Steven Brams & Douglas Muzzio, 1977. "Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 67-83, December.
  47. Steven J. Brams, 1977. "Deception in 2 × 2 Games," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 2(2), pages 171-203, February.
  48. Steven J. Brams, 1975. "Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(4), pages 596-612, December.
  49. Steven Brams & John Heilman, 1974. "When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 11-25, March.

Chapters

  1. Steven J. Brams, 2007. "Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures
    [Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and F
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  2. Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089 Elsevier.

Books

  1. Steven J. Brams, 2011. "Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015226, December.
  2. Steven J. Brams, 2002. "Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262523329, December.
  3. Brams,Steven J. & Taylor,Alan D., 1996. "Fair Division," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521556446, October.

NEP Fields

26 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2009-01-24
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (12) 2003-11-30 2003-12-07 2003-12-07 2007-11-24 2009-01-24 2009-07-28 2010-05-22 2010-05-22 2011-05-07 2011-05-07 2011-10-22 2014-06-14. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CIS: Confederation of Independent States (3) 2011-10-22 2011-10-22 2011-10-22
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2011-02-26
  5. NEP-DEM: Demographic Economics (1) 2013-07-15
  6. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (17) 2007-11-24 2007-11-24 2009-01-24 2009-01-24 2009-01-24 2009-01-24 2009-07-28 2010-05-22 2010-09-18 2011-02-26 2011-10-22 2011-10-22 2012-10-13 2013-06-24 2013-07-15 2014-06-14 2014-06-14. Author is listed
  7. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (4) 2009-01-24 2009-01-24 2011-10-22 2013-06-24
  8. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (6) 2004-09-12 2011-10-22 2011-10-22 2012-10-13 2013-06-24 2013-07-15. Author is listed
  9. NEP-NET: Network Economics (3) 2009-07-28 2010-05-22 2011-05-07
  10. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2003-11-30 2009-01-24
  11. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (9) 2003-11-30 2003-12-07 2003-12-07 2009-07-28 2010-05-22 2010-05-22 2011-05-07 2011-10-22 2014-06-14. Author is listed
  12. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (1) 2009-01-24

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Works
  3. Number of Distinct Works
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  7. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  8. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  9. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  10. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  11. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors

Most cited item

Most downloaded item (past 12 months)

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Corrections

For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Steven Brams should log into the RePEc Author Service

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.