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Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples

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Author Info
Brams, Steven J.
Mattli, Walter

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9391/RR92-52.pdf
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 92-52.

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Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: 1992
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:92-52

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Related research
Keywords: Game theory; economic equilibrium; economic theory;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Brams, Steven J. & Hessel Marek, 1980. "Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games," Working Papers 80-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J., 1991. "extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Papers 9130, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  3. Brams, Steven J. & Hessel, Marek P., 1982. "Threat Power in Sequential Games," Working Papers 82-14, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mertens, J-F., 1989. "Equilibrium And Rationality Context And History- Dependence," CORE Discussion Papers 1989027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Marschak, T A & Selten, Reinhard, 1978. "Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(1), pages 71-93, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Brams, Steven J. & Mor, Ben D., 1991. "When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?," Working Papers 91-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Franklin M. Fisher, 1989. "Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 113-124, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1991. " Rules and Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 121-49, May.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lester A. Zeager, . "A Model of Strategic Behavior in Three Cuban Refugee Crises," Working Papers 0202, East Carolina University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lester A. Zeager, . "Negotiations for Refugee Repatriation or Local Settlement: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 9730, East Carolina University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Brams, Steven J., 1995. "Modeling Free Choice in Games," Working Papers 95-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Brams, Steven J., 1992. "Cycles of Conflict," Working Papers 92-51, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Holler, Manfred J. & Wickstroem, Bengt-Arne, 1998. "The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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