A nail-biting election
AbstractIn the first competitive election for President of the Social Choice and Welfare Society, the (official) approval-voting winner differed from the (hypothetical) Borda count winner, who was also the Condorcet winner. But because the election was essentially a toss-up, it is impossible to say who should have won. The election for Council was more true to form of other professional-society elections, with the winners identical, and even their rankings almost duplicative, under both voting systems.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 11 April 2000/Accepted: 26 March 2001
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
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- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- repec:kap:expeco:v:11:y:2008:i:1:p:97-105 is not listed on IDEAS
- Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
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