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Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009

Author

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  • Brams, Steven J.
  • Camilo, Gustavo
  • Franz, Alexandra D.

Abstract

We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two terms, between 1969 and 2009. The predictions of majority coalitions on each of the courts are generally bourn out by the 5-4 decisions, whereas the predictions of the Martin-Quinn (2002) model, which assumes a single underlying dimension along which the justices can be ordered, are not. The present model also provides insight into the dynamic process by which subcoalitions build up into majority coalitions and, in addition, identifies "kingmakers” and “leaders” on the natural courts.

Suggested Citation

  • Brams, Steven J. & Camilo, Gustavo & Franz, Alexandra D., 2011. "Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009," MPRA Paper 30390, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30390
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 2013. "Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 1-18, June.
    2. Steven Brams & Michael Jones & D. Kilgour, 2005. "Forming stable coalitions: The process matters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 67-94, July.
    3. Brenner,Saul & Whitmeyer,Joseph M., 2009. "Strategy on the United States Supreme Court," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516723.
    4. Serguei Kaniovski & Dennis Leech, 2009. "A behavioral power index," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 17-29, October.
    5. Brenner,Saul & Whitmeyer,Joseph M., 2009. "Strategy on the United States Supreme Court," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521736343.
    6. Martin, Andrew D. & Quinn, Kevin M., 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 134-153, April.
    7. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D. Marc Kilgour, 2002. "Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 359-383, July.
    8. Kaniovski, Serguei & Leech, Dennia, 2009. "A behavioral power index," Economic Research Papers 269780, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coalition formation; U.S. Supreme Court; Martin-Quinn scores; single-peakedness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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