Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two terms, between 1969 and 2009. The predictions of majority coalitions on each of the courts are generally bourn out by the 5-4 decisions, whereas the predictions of the Martin-Quinn (2002) model, which assumes a single underlying dimension along which the justices can be ordered, are not. The present model also provides insight into the dynamic process by which subcoalitions build up into majority coalitions and, in addition, identifies "kingmakers” and “leaders” on the natural courts.
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- Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 2013. "Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 1-18, June.
- Steven Brams & Michael Jones & D. Kilgour, 2005. "Forming stable coalitions: The process matters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 67-94, July.
- Serguei Kaniovski & Dennis Leech, 2009.
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- Kaniovski, Serguei & Leech, Dennis, 2007. "A Behavioural Power Index," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 831, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D. Marc Kilgour, 2002. "Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 359-383, July.
- Martin, Andrew D. & Quinn, Kevin M., 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(02), pages 134-153, March.
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