IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Strategic Judicial Preference Revelation

Listed author(s):
  • Álvaro Bustos
  • Tonja Jacobi

We examine the revelation of preferences of justices whose true ideologies are not known at the moment of entering the Court but gradually become apparent through their judicial decisions. In the context of a two-period President-Senate-Court game — a generalization of Moraski and Shipan (1999) — we show that, while moderate new justices always vote truthfully, more extreme new justices may vote untruthfully at the beginning of their tenures. By concealing their true ideologies, new justices move the perceived ideology of the overall Court closer to their own, which in turn influences the selection of future members of the Court. New justices will sometimes have an incentive to exaggerate the extremeness of their overall preferences, and at other times they will seek to appear more moderate. The manifestation of the untruthful voting will depend on the characteristics of the cases they face, their initial ideologies and the ideologies of the President and Senate. Additionally, untruthful voting is more likely when the probabilities of retirement of the current justices are large. Finally, we assess judicial incentives to shape their perceived retirement probabilities.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 380.

in new window

Date of creation: 2010
Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:380
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Avda. Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago

Phone: (562) 354-4303
Fax: (562) 553-1664
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

in new window

  1. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2002. "Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and Discretionary Review," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0209, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Jan 2003.
  2. Bailey, Michael & Chang, Kelly H, 2001. "Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 477-506, October.
  3. Martin, Andrew D. & Quinn, Kevin M., 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(02), pages 134-153, March.
  4. Spiller, Pablo T. & Tiller, Emerson H., 1996. "Invitations to override: Congressional reversals of supreme court decisions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 503-521, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:380. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jaime Casassus)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.