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Communicating judicial retirement

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  • Bustos, Álvaro
  • Jacobi, Tonja

Abstract

Justices can strategically shape perceptions of their likely retirements, and so influence the President and Senate in choosing an ideologically compatible replacement. Relatively new justices can vote insincerely to affect how their ideologies are perceived, but their strategies are shaped by older justices’ expected retirement probabilities. We show that “strong messages” of retirement are likely when new justices vote insincerely and the new and retiring justices’ ideologies are aligned. “Weak messages” are more likely when new justices vote sincerely or, if they do vote insincerely, the old and new justices’ ideologies are unaligned.

Suggested Citation

  • Bustos, Álvaro & Jacobi, Tonja, 2015. "Communicating judicial retirement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 107-118.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:43:y:2015:i:c:p:107-118
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2015.06.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Signaling; Communication; Messages; Justices; Supreme Court; Retirement; Nominations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K30 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - General
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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