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Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting

In: Handbook on Approval Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Steven J. Brams

    (New York University)

  • Peter C. Fishburn

Abstract

Approval voting (AV) is a voting procedure in which voters can vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections (i.e., those with more than two candidates). Each candidate approved of receives one vote, and the candidate with the most votes wins.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn, 2010. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_3
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_3
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen, 1988. "The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 101-120, November.
    2. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn & Samuel Merrill, 1988. "The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 121-131, November.
    3. Laslier, Jean-François, 2006. "Spatial Approval Voting," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 160-185, April.
    4. Robert J. Weber, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter.
    5. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236, Elsevier.
    6. K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    7. Peter C. Fishburn & John D. C. Little, 1988. "An Experiment in Approval Voting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(5), pages 555-568, May.
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