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Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters

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Author Info
Steven J. Brams (Department of Politics, New York University, U.S.A.)
Michael A. Jones (Department of Mathematical Sciences, Montclair State University, U.S.A.)
D.Marc Kilgour (Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada)

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Abstract

Players are assumed to rank each other as coalition partners. Two processes of coalition formation are defined and illustrated: i) Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their preference rankings until some majority coalition, all of whose members consider each other mutually acceptable, forms. ii) Build-up (BU):Same descent as FB, except only majorities whose members rank each other highest form coalitions. BU coalitions are stable in the sense that no member would prefer to be in another coalition, whereas FB coalitions, whose members need not rank each other highest, may not be stable. BU coalitions are bimodally distributed in a random society, with peaks around simple majority and unanimity the distributions of majorities in the US Supreme Count and in the US House of Representatives follow this pattern. The dynamics of real-life coalition-formation processes are illustrated by two Supreme Court cases.

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2003.97.

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Date of creation: Oct 2003
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.97

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Keywords: Coalition dynamics Fallback bargaining Manipulability Legislatures US Supreme Court

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Steven Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Michael A. Jones, 2002. "Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions," Grand Coalition 49, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Antonio Romero-Medina & Katari´na Cechlárová, 2001. "Stability in coalition formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 487-494. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Greenberg Joseph & Weber Shlomo, 1993. "Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 62-82, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers 9133, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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  5. Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 1998. "Fallback Bargaining," Working Papers 98-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Asheim , Geir B. & Claussen , Carl Andreas & Nilssen, Tore, 2005. "Majority voting leads to unanimity," Memorandum 02/2005, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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