AbstractCette note est consacrÃ©e Ã la question:Quelle restriction impose-t-on en faisant l'hypothÃ¨se qu'un profil de prÃ©fÃ©rences est euclidien en dimension d ? En particulier on dÃ©montre qu'un profil de prÃ©fÃ©rences sur I individus et A alternatives peut Ãªtre reprÃ©sentÃ© par des utilitÃ©s euclidiennes en dimension d si et seulement si d est supÃ©rieur ou Ã©gal Ã min(I,A-1). On dÃ©crit aussi les systÃ¨mes de points qui permettent de reprÃ©senter tout profil sur A alternatives, et on donne quelques rÃ©sultats quand seules les prÃ©fÃ©rences strictes sont considÃ©rÃ©es.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 43 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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