Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
AbstractRecent works on political competition incorporate a valence dimension to the standard spatial model. The goal of this paper is to axiomatize rankings of candidates by voters that are consistent with Euclidean preferences on the policy space and an additive valence dimension. Specifically, we consider the case where only the ideal point in the policy space and the ranking over candidates are known for each voter. We characterize the case where there are policies x1,…,xm for m candidates and numbers v1,…,vm representing valence scores, such that a voter with an ideal policy y ranks the candidates according to vi−‖xi−y‖2.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4-5 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Elections; Spatial models; Valence; Euclidean preferences;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Foundations of spatial preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 200-205, March.
- Navin Kartik & R. Preston McAfee, 2007. "Signaling Character in Electoral Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 852-870, June.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. " Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-36, June.
- Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2010.
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 5(1), January.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2008. "Rationalizable Voting," Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy WP51, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:18:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Norman Schofield, 2007. "The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 965-980.
- Vicki Knoblauch, 2008.
"Recognizing One-Dimensional Euclidean Preference Profiles,"
Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
2008-52, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Knoblauch, Vicki, 2010. "Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-5, January.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Laslier, Jean-Francois, 2007.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 87-98, February.
- Callander, Steven & Wilson, Catherine H., 2008. "Context-dependent voting and political ambiguity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 565-581, April.
- Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012.
"Political competition between differentiated candidates,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 249-271.
- Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2009. "Political Competition between Differentiated Candidates," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 2560, CESifo Group Munich.
- Gilboa,Itzhak & Schmeidler,David, 2001.
"A Theory of Case-Based Decisions,"
Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521003117.
- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
- Gersbach, Hans, 1998. "Communication skills and competition for donors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-18, February.
- Arianna Degan, 2007. "Candidate Valence: Evidence From Consecutive Presidential Elections," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 457-482, 05.
- Dix, Manfred & Santore, Rudy, 2002. "Candidate ability and platform choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 189-194, July.
- Gilboa, I. & Schmeidler, D., 2001.
"A Derivation of Expected Utility Maximization in the Context of a Game,"
Papers, Tel Aviv
2001-18, Tel Aviv.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 172-182, July.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 2001. "A Derivation of Expected Utility Maximization in the Context of a Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1342, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
- Degan, Arianna & Merlo, Antonio, 2009. "Do voters vote ideologically?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1868-1894, September.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Gerhard Jäger & Lars Koch-Metzger & Frank Riedel, 2009. "Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 420, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.