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Euclidean Revealed Preferences: Testing the Spatial Voting Model

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  • Marc Henry

    (Departement de Sciences Economiques, Universite de Montleal)

  • Ismael Mourifie

    (Departement de Sciences Economiques, Universite de Montleal)

Abstract

In the spatial model of voting, voters choose the candidate closest to them in the ideological space. Recent work by (Degan and Merlo 2009) shows that it is falsifiable on the basis of individual voting data in multiple elections. We show how to tackle the fact that the model only partially identifies the distribution of voting profiles and we give a formal revealed preference test of the spatial voting model in 3 national elections in the US, and strongly reject the spatial model in all cases. We also construct confidence regions for partially identified voter characteristics in an augmented model with unobserved valence dimension, and identify the amount of voter heterogeneity necessary to reconcile the data with spatial preferences.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-822.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2011cf822

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  1. Anna Bogomolnaïa & Jean-François Laslier, 2004. "Euclidean preferences," Working Papers hal-00242941, HAL.
  2. Li, Qi & Racine, Jeffrey S, 2008. "Nonparametric Estimation of Conditional CDF and Quantile Functions With Mixed Categorical and Continuous Data," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 26, pages 423-434.
  3. Richard Blundell & Martin Browning & Ian Crawford, 2008. "Best Nonparametric Bounds on Demand Responses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1227-1262, November.
  4. Borsch-Supan, Axel, 1990. "On the compatibility of nested logit models with utility maximization," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 373-388, March.
  5. Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2010. "Rationalizable voting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(1), January.
  6. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  7. Heckman, James J, 1978. "Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 931-59, July.
  8. Chesher, Andrew D, 1984. "Testing for Neglected Heterogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 865-72, July.
  9. Ruud H Koning & Geert Ridder, 1999. "Discrete Choice and Stochastic Utility Maximization," Economics Working Paper Archive 413, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  10. Norman Schofield, 2007. "The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 965-980.
  11. Degan, Arianna & Merlo, Antonio, 2009. "Do voters vote ideologically?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1868-1894, September.
  12. Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler & Guido W. Imbens & Karthik Kalyanaraman, 2010. "An Empirical Model for Strategic Network Formation," NBER Working Papers 16039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Mahieu, Ronald J & Raes, Louis, 2013. "Inferring hawks and doves from voting records," CEPR Discussion Papers 9418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Florenz Plassmann & T. Tideman, 2014. "How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 31-75, January.

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