Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cassette, Aurélie
  • Farvaque, Etienne
  • Héricourt, Jérôme

Abstract

Using a new database of French municipalities that covers 821 towns and 2 elections (2001 and 2008), we examine how the budget structure, degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent. We assess the specicities created by the two-round process under French electoral rule (a dual ballot under plurality rule). We show that in the first round of the electoral process, spending on equipment can influence the voter, and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent's score. In the second round, the incumbent's vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect. We show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense. The results suggest that the determinants of each round in a two-round electoral process are different.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34675/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 34675.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 09 Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:34675

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Economic voting; Local elections; Plurality rule; Visible expenditures;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, 1987. "The Politics of Ambiguity," NBER Working Papers 2468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Froot, Kenneth A., 1989. "Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Cross-Sectional Dependence and Heteroskedasticity in Financial Data," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(03), pages 333-355, September.
  3. Toke Aidt & Francisco Veiga & Linda Veiga, 2011. "Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 21-44, July.
  4. A. Kamakura, Wagner & Afonso Mazzon, Jose & De Bruyn, Arnaud, 2006. "Modeling voter choice to predict the final outcome of two-stage elections," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 689-706.
  5. Sakurai, Sergio N. & Menezes, Naercio A., 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Insper Working Papers wpe_117, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
  6. Bordignon, Massimo & Nannicini, Tommaso & Tabellini, Guido, 2013. "Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule," IZA Discussion Papers 7561, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Francisco JosÈ Veiga & Linda GonÁalves Veiga, 2004. "The Determinants of Vote Intentions in Portugal," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 341-364, 03.
  8. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in A Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338, November.
  9. Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2008. "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2203-20, December.
  10. Christine Fauvelle-Aymar & Abel François, 2006. "The impact of closeness on turnout: An empirical relation based on a study of a two-round ballot," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 461-483, June.
  11. Larry M. Bartels & Henry E. Brady, 2003. "Economic Behavior in Political Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 156-161, May.
  12. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition," NBER Working Papers 4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Moulton, Brent R., 1986. "Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 385-397, August.
  14. Antoine Auberger & Eric Dubois, 2005. "The Influence of Local and National Economic Conditions on French Legislative Elections," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00800638, HAL.
  15. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
  16. Vella, Francis & Verbeek, Marno, 1999. "Estimating and Interpreting Models with Endogenous Treatment Effects," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 17(4), pages 473-78, October.
  17. Degan, Arianna & Merlo, Antonio, 2009. "Do voters vote ideologically?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1868-1894, September.
  18. Kneebone, R.D. & McKenzie, K.J., 1998. "Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: an Examination of Canadian Provinces," Papers 98-06, Calgary - Department of Economics.
  19. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  20. Rodrigo Martins & Francisco Veiga, 2013. "Economic voting in Portuguese municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 317-334, June.
  21. Swank, O H, 1993. " Popularity Functions Based on the Partisan Theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 339-56, April.
  22. Drazen, Allan & Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 39-52, May.
  23. Brender, Adi, 2003. "The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989-1998," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2187-2205, September.
  24. Martial Foucault & Thierry Madies & Sonia Paty, 2008. "Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 57-80, October.
  25. Peltzman, Sam, 1987. "Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 293-97, May.
  26. Auberger, Antoine, 2004. "Les fonctions de vote : un survol de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 80(1), pages 95-107, Mars.
  27. Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, 2009. "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities-super-," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 124(1), pages 399-422, February.
  28. André Blais & Simon Labbé-St-Vincent & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Vote choice in one round and two round elections," Working Papers hal-00335060, HAL.
  29. Marcela Eslava, 2011. "The Political Economy Of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 645-673, 09.
  30. Richard Blundell & Monica Costa Dias, 2000. "Evaluation methods for non-experimental data," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 21(4), pages 427-468, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne, 2013. ""In consideration of the children", really? Adoption of the school-rhythm reform by French municipalities," MPRA Paper 50995, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Caseette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne, 2013. "Are Elections Debt Brakes? Evidence from French Municipalities," MPRA Paper 48808, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Maria Teresa Balaguer-Coll & María Isabel Brun-Martos & Anabel Forte & Emili Tortosa-Ausina, 2014. "Determinants of local governments’ reelection: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach," Working Papers 2014/06, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:34675. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.