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Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

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  • Massimo Bordignon

    ()
    (DISCE, Università Cattolica)

  • Guido Tabellini

    (Università Bocconi)

Abstract

We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremists voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.

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File URL: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza/Quaderni/ief0087.pdf
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Paper provided by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) in its series DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza with number ief0087.

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Length: nn pages 63
Date of creation: Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie3:ief0087

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Web page: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanza
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Keywords: political extremism;

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Cited by:
  1. Sandro Brusco & Marcin Dziubinski & Jaideep Roy, 2010. "The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics 10-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  2. Bordignon, Massimo & Monticini, Andrea, 2012. "The importance of the electoral rule: Evidence from Italy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 322-325.
  3. Veronica Grembi & Tommaso Nannicini & Ugo Troiano, 2011. "Policy Responses to Fiscal Restraints: A Difference-in-Discontinuities Design," Working Papers 397, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  4. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "H.P. Minsky And Policies To Countervail Crises," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  5. Guido De Blasio & Guglielmo Barone, 2011. "Local electoral rules and political participation," ERSA conference papers ersa11p418, European Regional Science Association.
  6. Parrotta, Pierpaolo & Pozzoli, Dario & Sala, Davide, 2014. "Ethnic Diversity and Firms' Export Behavior," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 2/2014, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
  7. Per Pettersson-Lidbom, 2004. "Does the Size of the Legislature Affect the Size of Government? Evidence from Two Natural Experiments," Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT) 350, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
  8. Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne & Héricourt, Jérôme, 2011. "Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections," MPRA Paper 34675, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Sandro Brusco & Luca Colombo & Umberto Galmarini, 2010. "Local Governments Tax Autonomy, Lobbying, and Welfare," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0097, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  10. Massimo Bordignon & Andrea Monticini, 2011. "The importance of electoral rule: Evidence from Italy," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0099, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  11. Marco Portmann & David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2012. "District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 585-610, June.
  12. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "The Debate on the Crisis: Recent Reappraisals of the Concept of Functional Finance," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0105, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  13. Massimo Bordignon & Gilberto Turati, 2014. "Electoral Rules and Municipal Finances: Evidence From Two Reforms in Italy," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(1), pages 24-28, 04.

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