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Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

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  • Massimo Bordignon
  • Tommaso Nannicini
  • Guido Tabellini

Abstract

We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University in its series Working Papers with number 348.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:348

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  1. Imbens, Guido W. & Lemieux, Thomas, 2008. "Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 615-635, February.
  2. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2008. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University 346, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  3. Laurent Bouton & Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "Majority Runoff Elections: Strategic Voting and Duverger's Hypothesis," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales 2013-23, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Massimo Bordignon & Andrea Monticini, 2011. "The Importance of the Electoral Rule: Evidence from Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3347, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Sandro Brusco & Marcin Dziubinski & Jaideep Roy, 2010. "The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics 10-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  3. Sandro Brusco & Luca Colombo & Umberto Galmarini, 2010. "Local Governments Tax Autonomy, Lobbying, and Welfare," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics 10-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  4. Massimo Bordignon & Andrea Monticini, 2011. "The importance of electoral rule: Evidence from Italy," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0099, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  5. Veronica Grembi & Tommaso Nannicini & Ugo Troiano, 2012. "Policy Responses to Fiscal Restraints: A Difference-in-Discontinuities Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 3999, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Pettersson-Lidbom, Per, 2012. "Does the size of the legislature affect the size of government? Evidence from two natural experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 269-278.
  7. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "The Debate on the Crisis: Recent Reappraisals of the Concept of Functional Finance," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0105, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  8. Parrotta, Pierpaolo & Pozzoli, Dario & Sala, Davide, 2014. "Ethnic Diversity and Firms' Export Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 7923, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Aurélie Cassette & Etienne Farvaque & Jérôme Héricourt, 2013. "Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 563-591, September.
  10. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "H.P. Minsky And Policies To Countervail Crises," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  11. Marco Portmann & David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2012. "District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 585-610, June.
  12. Guido De Blasio & Guglielmo Barone, 2011. "Local electoral rules and political participation," ERSA conference papers ersa11p418, European Regional Science Association.
  13. Massimo Bordignon & Gilberto Turati, 2014. "Electoral Rules and Municipal Finances: Evidence From Two Reforms in Italy," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(1), pages 24-28, 04.

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