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Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

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  • Massimo Bordignon
  • Guido Tabellini

Abstract

We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2600.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2600

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Keywords: run-off; municipal elections; political bargaining; property;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Massimo Bordignon & Andrea Monticini, 2011. "The Importance of the Electoral Rule: Evidence from Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 3347, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Per Pettersson-Lidbom, 2004. "Does the Size of the Legislature Affect the Size of Government? Evidence from Two Natural Experiments," Discussion Papers, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT) 350, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
  3. Grembi, Veronica & Nannicini, Tommaso & Troiano, Ugo, 2012. "Policy Responses to Fiscal Restraints: A Difference-in-Discontinuities Design," IZA Discussion Papers 6952, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Guido De Blasio & Guglielmo Barone, 2011. "Local electoral rules and political participation," ERSA conference papers ersa11p418, European Regional Science Association.
  5. Sandro Brusco & Marcin Dziubinski & Jaideep Roy, 2010. "The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics 10-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  6. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "H.P. Minsky And Policies To Countervail Crises," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  7. Aurélie Cassette & Etienne Farvaque & Jérôme Héricourt, 2013. "Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 563-591, September.
  8. Massimo Bordignon & Gilberto Turati, 2014. "Electoral Rules and Municipal Finances: Evidence From Two Reforms in Italy," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(1), pages 24-28, 04.
  9. Sandro Brusco & Luca Colombo & Umberto Galmarini, 2010. "Local Governments Tax Autonomy, Lobbying, and Welfare," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics 10-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  10. Massimo Bordignon & Andrea Monticini, 2011. "The importance of electoral rule: Evidence from Italy," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0099, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  11. Marco Portmann & David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2012. "District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 585-610, June.
  12. Parrotta, Pierpaolo & Pozzoli, Dario & Sala, Davide, 2014. "Ethnic Diversity and Firms' Export Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 7923, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2011. "The Debate on the Crisis: Recent Reappraisals of the Concept of Functional Finance," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) ief0105, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

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