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Do voters vote ideologically?

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Author Info

  • Degan, Arianna
  • Merlo, Antonio

Abstract

In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote "ideologically" (i.e., they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically "closest" to them) testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is potentially falsifiable, and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 144 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1868-1894

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:1868-1894

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

Related research

Keywords: Voting Spatial models Falsifiability Testing;

References

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  10. Abdul Ghafar Noury & Simon Hix & Gérard Roland, 2006. "Dimensions of politics in the European Parliament," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7750, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Anghel Negriu & Cyrille Piatecki, 2012. "On the performance of voting systems in spatial voting simulations," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 63-77, May.
  2. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2009. "Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities," NBER Working Papers 14857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Brian Knight, 2012. "On the Selection of Arbitrators," Working Papers 2012-8, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Andrei Gomberg, 2011. "Vote Revelation: Empirical Characterization of Scoring Rules," Working Papers 1102, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  5. Gianmarco Le�n, 2013. "Turnout, Political Preferences and Information: Experimental Evidence from Peru," Working Papers 691, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  6. Azrieli, Yaron, 2011. "Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 545-553.
  7. Jinhui H. Bai & Roger Laguno ff, 2010. "Revealed Political Power," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000106, David K. Levine.
  8. Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Foundations of spatial preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 200-205, March.
  9. Spenkuch, Jörg L., 2012. "Please don’t vote for me: strategic voting in a natural experiment with perverse incentives," MPRA Paper 38416, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne & Héricourt, Jérôme, 2011. "Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections," MPRA Paper 34675, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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