A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature`s strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies). We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly represented by expected utility maximization with respect to an almost-unique state-dependent utility, that is, a matrix assigning real numbers to act-state pairs.
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Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number
2001-18.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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Chambers, Christopher P. & Hayashi, Takashi, 2008.
"Choice and individual welfare,"
Working Papers
1286, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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